Abstract -The effect of financial liberalization on private saving is theoretically ambiguous, not only because the link between interest rate levels and saving is itself ambiguous, but also because financial liberalization is a multidimensional and phased process, sometimes involving reversals. Using principal components, we construct 25-year time-series indices of financial liberalization for each of eight developing countries: Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. These are employed in an econometric analysis of private saving in these countries. Our results cannot offer support for the hypothesis that financial liberalization will increase saving. On the contrary, the indications are that liberalization overall-and in particular those elements that relax liquidity constraints-may be associated with a fall in saving.
I. Introduction
A WAVE OF liberalization of financial markets has swept over much of the developing world, especially since the mid-1980s. This liberalization has been characterized by greater scope being granted to market forces in determining interest rates and in allocating credit (Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson (1994) ). Although this has occurred under the pressure of increased globalization of financial markets and following the example of many industrial countries, there has been an expectation that financial liberalization would help economic development. In particular, the early literature on financial repression, following McKinnon (1973) and Shaw (1973) , stressed the potential role of higher interest rates in mobilizing savings that could be put to productive use.
But it is far from clear that financial liberalization actually does increase private saving. One obvious and important consideration is that the effect of interest rates on saving is itself ambiguous, as the income effect might offset substitution effects. In addition, one must recognize that financial liberalization involves more than just a change in interest rates. Other dimensions of financial liberalization, such as increased household access to consumer credit or housing finance, might also work to reduce private saving (Muellbauer and Murphy (1990) , Jappelli and Pagano (1994) ). 1 Furthermore, the long-term effect of liberalization on saving may differ substantially from the impact effect. Lastly, financial liberalization is a process rather than a one-shot event.
The purpose of this paper is to provide an empirical examination of the total effect of the financial reform on aggregate private saving based on eight case studies: Chile, Ghana, Indonesia, Korea, Malaysia, Mexico, Turkey, and Zimbabwe. These countries have all significantly liberalized their financial sector policies, but they differ in the nature and phasing of financial liberalization, in other aspects of their policy reform program, and in the macroeconomic context in which liberalization took place. This variety allows us to explore the degree to which the saving response differs from country to country, as well as to test whether the response is a common one.
Financial reform typically comprises several key phases that are often separated by several years. Reform measures are introduced in a number of different dimensions: interest rates, credit allocation, bank ownership, prudential regulation, security markets, and openness of the capital account. The best sequencing of these various elements is frequently debated. In practice, reform has not been a monotonic process: In some cases, setbacks have involved temporary policy reversals.
A thorough quantitative assessment of the impact of such a process must take account of its gradual and reversible nature. Based on an analysis of the historical evolution in each case, we have identified the timing of major moves on eight different dimensions towards a more liberalized system. Using the principal components of the resulting matrices of 0-1 variables (1's correspond to the years after a particular reform is introduced), we obtain a single continuous financial liberalization index for each of our countries. As an alternative, we also construct for each country a pair of subindices that capture different aspects of the liberalization process. Our data extends over a quarter of a century-a period long enough to allow us to model the response to liberalization in each country separately-but in addition to the country-by-country results, we also present panel data evidence.
Visual inspection of the time series of the main relevant variables-the financial liberalization index, the real interest rate, monetary depth (either M2 or total credit to the private sector expressed as a percentage of GNDI), and the private saving ratio-reveals little evidence of a clear-cut relationship between saving and liberalization.
We estimate an econometric relationship expressing the private saving ratio as a function of the real interest rate and of the index of financial liberalization (or its subcomponents), along with income, inflation, and government saving. In addition to directly measuring the contribution of liberalization to the volume of aggregate saving, our procedure improves on earlier estimates of the saving-interest relation, which omitted any role for financial-sector liberalization other than the real interest rate channel.
Although they cannot be solved-out for a net effect on the level of saving, Euler equations can be helpful in detecting the extent of credit rationing. In this spirit, we also assess the impact of financial reform on the extent of liquidity constraints by estimating an augmented Euler equation for consumption, in which it is assumed (in an extension of the model of Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991) ) that the fraction of the consumers are liquidity constrained varies with the degree of financial liberalization.
The structure of the paper is as follows. Section II describes the main channels through which financial liberalization may affect saving and briefly reviews the relevant empirical literature. Section III describes the financial reform process as it occurred in each of the eight countries being studied here. This section also explains and graphs our index of financial liberalization and examines the prima facie evidence about its effects. Sections IV and V present the econometric results based on the saving function and on the augmented Euler equation for consumption, respectively. Section VI concludes.
II. Financial Liberalization and Saving: Theoretical Background and Review of the Empirical Evidence
Although financial liberalization can enhance the efficiency with which saved resources are channeled into productive use, the effect on the quantity of saving is theoretically ambiguous. 2 The mechanisms at work here include both long-term and short-term effects. Once it has settled down, a competitive, liberalized financial system will typically be characterized by improved saving opportunities, including higher deposit interest rates, a wider range of savings media with improved risk-return characteristics, and, in many cases, more banks and bank branches, as well as other financial intermediaries. Bank lending rates will typically be higher for those borrowers who had privileged access in the restricted regime, but access to borrowing should be wider. These long-term effects of liberalization on aggregate private saving will be felt through changes in rates of return and in the degree of credit restrictions. Moreover, if financial liberalization also has a favorable effect on the allocation of resources, this will generate increases in income that will in turn increase saving. 3 The process of financial liberalization also unleashes a series of short-run effects. Not only can the process of domestic portfolio adjustment lead to transitory changes in the volume of domestic saving, but (especially when combined with liberalization of the foreign exchange market) it may also induce large capital inflows, largely but not exclusively attributable to a return flow of past flight capital. If not sterilized, such inflows can result in a credit boom leading to real income surges, which in turn have a direct, but transitory, effect on the volume of saving. Modeling of the effect of financial liberalization on saving needs to take account of these short-run effects, as well as the long-run effect. It is also important to recognize that some of the overall effects can come through the effect of income on saving.
A. Steady-State Effects
If financial liberalization improves the rate of return for savers, then knowledge of the interest elasticity of saving can help predict the long-term impact of liberalization on saving. However, because of the wealth and current income effects that will generally be present, there is no presumption as to the direction of the aggregate saving response to an exogenous interest rate change. Despite many studies, this remains an empirically controversial area, partly because of a surprising shortage of reliable and comparable crosscountry data on retail interest rates. Recent reviews by Balassa (1990) , Srinivasan (1993), and Fry (1995) conclude that more studies have found a positive interest elasticity of saving than a negative one, but the coefficients have generally been small and often insignificant. 4 Furthermore, the theoretical impact on saving of the improved opportunities for hedging and risk reduction that can also become available as a result of financial liberalization is equally ambiguous.
Possibly of greater importance for aggregate saving than deposit interest rates may be the availability of a variety of alternative, nonfinancial assets, the return on which may not be captured by deposit interest rates. While the use of real interest rates implicitly acknowledges that goods inventories are an alternative to financial assets, it would be very useful in principle to take explicit account of alternative investment opportunities, notably the rate of return on owner-occupied housing and other real-estate investment. Many developing countries have experienced property booms, and household saving may have been very sensitive to the after-tax rate of 2 It should be stressed at the outset that our evidence is based chiefly on National Accounts definitions of saving. These need to be distinguished from intermediated saving or from capital flows. Dornbusch and Reynoso (1989) observe that capital flight through misinvoicing of trade serves to conceal saving that is being hidden abroad: An apparent increase in saving may really be a reduction in capital flight. Furthermore, they note that, as durable goods purchases are usually treated as consumption in the data, a shift from these to accumulation of financial assets tends to be misleadingly recorded as saving.
3 It should be noted that increased household borrowing may not all go to consumption or housing. A relaxation of borrowing constraints could promote human capital formation, though this will normally be measured as consumption in the National Accounts. 4 The effect of interest rates on saving could be nonlinear, perhaps involving threshold effects. Reynoso (1989) presents some evidence that the response of savings to the interest rate may be represented by a parabola, with savings increasing most significantly when interest rates go from sharply negative to just below zero, then leveling off, and finally declining as real interest rates become very large and positive, in which case they may reflect political uncertainty, peso-effects, bank insolvency, and the like. For a general review of saving decisions see Browning and Lusardi (1996) . return on investment in real estate. (See, for example, Koskela and Virén (1994) .) Unfortunately, in most cases, data on such rates of return are not available for developing countries.
Measured interest rates may not reflect capital market realities if households and small enterprises are constrained from borrowing what they would wish because of financial repression or for other reasons. To the extent that liberalization reduces these borrowing constraints, saving ratios could be lowered (Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994) ). Two mechanisms are at work here. First, when the borrowing constraint binds, it induces the individual to consume less. Second, even when the constraints are not binding in the current period, the expectation that they may bind in the future reduces today's consumption.
A very large literature, in response to Hall's (1978) original contribution, has attempted to gauge the importance of borrowing constraints by inferring that any dependence of the change in consumption on income might reflect the inability of households to smooth the intertemporal pattern of their consumption through borrowing. (See, for instance, Campbell and Mankiw (1989, 1991) and Zeldes (1989) .) 5 The developing-country literature here generally confirms the importance of such dependence, with some indication that it has been higher for developing countries. (See, for instance, Rossi (1988) , Haque and Montiel (1989) , and Corbo and Schmidt-Hebbel (1991) .)
B. Transitional Effects of Liberalization
The impact effect of financial liberalization on saving could be larger than the sustained long-term effect. This is because households will be able to revise target precautionary balances, allowing, for example, some middle-aged households that had hitherto been constrained from lifecycle borrowing to consume at a higher rate than they would have over a full lifetime of unconstrained access to borrowing. These transitional effects suggest that aggregate household saving could dip below its steady-state level, and that a surge in consumption may be observed (Muellbauer (1994) ). Moreover, as noted above, financial liberalization has been accompanied by real-estate booms in some countries; the resulting increase in real wealth also may have a temporarily negative impact on saving. 6 The large capital inflows that have been associated with recent liberalizations have also had complex, short-term, macroeconomic consequences. Liberalization of the domestic financial system has typically been only one element of a package of reforms that have been associated with these inflows, and the inflows have proved to be easily reversible. The impact on saving comes through the associated changes in availability and cost of credit, revised expectations of income growth, and increases in financial wealth, especially due to upward movements in property prices. All this may lead to consumption booms and to a fall in the saving rate.
C. Quantifying the Effects of Financial Liberalization on Saving
Most empirical examinations of the effects of financial liberalization or, more generally, of financial development on saving have involved adding one or more variables to established econometric specifications either of saving or of the rate of change in consumption. The simplest specifications identify pre-and post-liberalization periods with a dummy variable (an early example is de Melo and Tybout (1986) for Uruguay); an alternative is to specify a linear trend reflecting gradual liberalization (Muellbauer and Murphy (1993) for the UK).
Others have employed such proxy variables as the volume of consumer credit (such as Jappelli and Pagano (1989, 1994) ). Ostry and Levy (1995) used this variable both on its own and in interaction with an interest rate, and concluded that liberalization had not only lowered saving in France but had transformed a negative association between saving and interest rates into a positive one (cf. Bayoumi (1993) for the UK). An easing of credit market conditions facing households was also detected for the 1980s in Scandinavian countries by Koskela, Loikkanen, and Virén (1992) , and Lehmussaari (1990) . Here the effect on saving came indirectly through the impact of increased housing finance on house prices.
In their thirty-country study, Jappelli and Pagano (1994) also found another type of credit availability variable to be highly significant, namely the normal loan-to-value ratio obtainable from mortgage finance institutions: an increase of fifteen percentage points in the loan-to-value ratio reducing the national saving rate by 2.6 percentage points. This substantial effect may not be entirely housing related, as the variable may be capturing movements in wider credit availability.
Other proxy measures of the prevalence of credit constraints that have been used include the percentage of homeowners in certain age groups, the interest rate wedge on consumer and mortgage loans (Jappelli and Pagano (1989) ), and the rate of consumer credit delinquencies (Carroll (1992) ). Confirming the evidence for industrial countries, Vaidyanathan (1993) shows that international variations in the sensitivity of consumption to income are positively related to financial depth (measured by the ratio of 5 The household's inability to borrow at wholesale-market interest rates may be a rationing phenomenon, or it may reflect a large wedge between retail deposit and borrowing rates (for example, money-lender rates). A lower wedge would reduce saving, as King (1985) found for the United Kingdom. See also Alessie, Devereux, and Weber (1993) for an analysis of the effects of abolition of credit controls on the demand for cars in the United Kingdom.
6 Financial liberalization could affect the value of human and nonhuman wealth in a variety of ways. An increase in the value of nonhuman wealth will normally, ceteris paribus, reduce saving as consumption out of income can now be permanently higher. However, it is hard to isolate such wealth effects on saving of financial liberalization, not only because of the difficulty of measuring human and nonhuman wealth, but also because other reforms affecting wealth are usually being undertaken at the same time.
M2 to GDP), suggesting again the importance of liquidity constraints.
More directly, Miles (1992) estimated that 80% of the total amount of home equity withdrawn by U.K. households each year in the 1980s was consumed (rather than involving just a portfolio shift), accounting for essentially all of the collapse in the U.K. personal saving ratio from 12% to less than 5%.
The existence of well-functioning stock markets could also be a factor influencing saving by offering an improved risk-return frontier while retaining liquidity. Again, as mentioned, the predicted impact on aggregate saving is theoretically ambiguous, and recent empirical evidence suggests that funds attracted to liquid stock markets in developing countries come mainly as a switch from other assets. 7
III. Financial Reform: Measurement and Effects

A. Financial Repression and the Process of Reform
The multifaceted nature of financial reform-involving deregulation, liberalization, globalization, and privatizationcomplicates the measurement of its effects. In addition, the reforms undertaken in each country have reflected the perceived problems of the pre-reform environment. Prior to reform, most countries experienced a period of mild or severe financial repression: intervention by governments in allocating and pricing credit, controlling what banks and other intermediaries could do, using intermediaries as taxcollection devices, and often limiting competition, in particular from foreign institutions. These interventions varied by country, and in some countries included government ownership of banks as a very direct way of influencing how they did business. 8 In developing countries, intervention in the financial sector went considerably further than the regulation of interest rates and of credit expansion that characterized industrial-country policy. In some countries, banks were required to hold as much as one-half or more of their liabilities in the form of reserve or liquid assets (often deposits at the central bank), and another large part of the portfolio was dominated by directed credit. Although the latter might have been structured so as to leave significant discretion to the banks for credit assessment and monitoring (as in Japan), in practice, in many cases little power or responsibility was left to the banks. 9 In such cases, with most of their balance sheet effectively out of their own control, banks invested little in credit assessment, monitoring, or asset-liability skills, and in the extreme cases-formerly socialist economies-the result was a low skill base in finance and little of the infrastructure that supports marketbased financial intermediaries. 10 Beginning in many countries in the 1970s and accelerating subsequently, governments began to reconsider moredirect interventions, and financial reform programs have included attempts to reduce or redirect the government's role, most noticeably in the area of pricing and directing credit. The path of reforms often was influenced by government views, initial conditions, and political pressures for reform. For example, in Chile, real interest rates had been negative for decades prior to the removal of controls in 1974, and this decontrol was quite sudden. In contrast, following mild repression in the 1960s, Malaysian authorities in early 1973-like their Japanese counterparts much later-began deregulating some longer-term interest deposit rates but let several years pass before all controls were removed. A very gradual process also characterized the Korean experience. At times, the process was rather bumpy with reimposition of controls after an initial bout of liberalization, as in Chile and Malaysia. Often the reimposition of controls was a consequence of a severe banking crisis that developed in an unstable macro context, characterized by large capital inflows, and excessive risk-taking in the absence of effective prudential regulation, as in Chile in the early 1980s.
Reforms in general include two parts: outright deregulation, limiting the government's direct intervention, and putting in its place a system of prudential regulation aimed at ensuring the safety and soundness of banking. In addition, there is an institution-building component. The latter likely is a key component of the reform process: During periods of substantial intervention, especially where most risk is born by government, the demand for financial infrastructureaccounting, auditing, legal systems, and other financerelated skills-is quite limited. When this intervention is lessened, and if the incentive structure is right, intermediaries start devoting more resources to risk and credit analysis, for example, and spend more to upgrade the quality of their staff.
B. Measuring Financial Reform
The ideal index of financial reform would attempt to measure both the various aspects of the deregulatory and the 7 Levine and Zervos (1996) ; see also Bonser-Neal and Dewenter (1996) . This conclusion was drawn from the insignificance of indicators of stock market development in cross-sectional regressions in which the dependent variable was the ratio of private saving to GDP.
8 In addition to concerns about an inherent instability of finance, these interventions were often rationalized by a view that finance was not decisive for growth unless harnessed by a benevolent planner. Levine (1997) discusses some of the historical context and developments of attitudes about the financial system, and Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson (1994) describe financial reforms in Chile, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and New Zealand. See also Caprio and Klingebiel (1996) . 9 In some cases, the small size of the economy meant that a government requirement to provide financial support for a sector such as steel-making meant in practice lending to a single steel company, with the result that the banks viewed the risk as belonging to the authorities.
10 See Caprio and Claessens (1997) for a discussion of initial conditions in reforming financial systems. They argue that long periods of financial repression greatly weakened the skills, incentives, and infrastructure in finance and therefore complicated the reform process.
institution-building process. Unfortunately, short of using outcome measures such as the development of markets as a proxy-an approach leading to ambiguity in interpretation and endogeneity problems-it seems impossible at present to find useful measures of institutional development. For these reasons, we have chosen to build our index of reform from explicit policy changes that, though not wholly independent of wider economic conditions, should be less subject to endogeneity problems.
Our index thus summarizes exogenous changes in interestrate regulation, reserve requirements, directed credit, bank ownership (moves toward privatization), procompetition measures, liberalization of securities markets, prudential regulation, and international financial liberalization. Based on an analysis of the historical evolution in each case, we have identified the timing of major moves towards, and sometimes away from, a more liberalized system under each of these eight headings. (Appendix A gives the details.) For the particular dimension of deregulation (or institution building) affected by each move, we have created a 0-1 dummy variable, with 1 characterizing the more liberalized regime. This yields a matrix of 0-1 variables for each country. Rather than attempting to use all of these dummy variables in the econometrics (leading to degrees of freedom and collinearity problems), we have constructed for each country the principal components of the matrix. We use the first principal component (or a weighted average of the most important principal components) as our liberalization index in the regressions of section IV below. 11 In all cases, a higher value of the index in a given year captures a regime that is overall more market oriented. 12 For all countries, the first principal component accounts for a high percentage of the total variation: more than 62% for all countries except Malaysia, for which the percentage is also high at 44% (cf. table 2, part I). This gives us confidence that the index based on the first principal component is capturing much of the total information in the matrix of dummies.
The resulting index is shown in figures 1 through 8, with data on financial depth (M2 or total credit to the private sector as a percentage of gross national disposable income (GNDI)), real interest rates, and the private saving rate (measured as a share of GNDI). We have used a definition of the private saving rate, both unadjusted and adjusted for capital losses due to inflation on domestic assets denominated in local currency. For example, in figure 1a , the index captures the partial reversal of reforms in Chile resulting from the twin banking and debt crises of 1982. 13 Likewise, figure 5a clearly charts the fact that decontrol was initially short lived in Malaysia (see figure 5a), in part because banks were observed to be slow to reduce rates as their cost of funds declined, but also because a moderately severe banking crisis led Malaysian authorities to reimpose interestrate controls for several years in the mid-1980s. 14 Significant but different reforms were introduced in all of the countries under review. As seen in the data for Chile and Malaysia, reform can see significant reversals, and more generally is not a linear process but one that proceeds in fits and starts.
C. Visual Evidence on Saving and Reform
The figures provide no visual evidence of a clear positive association between either index (or real interest rates) and private saving for most countries. This is also confirmed by the bivariate correlation coefficient between saving and the index, contemporaneous or lagged (not reported for reasons of space). Only for Turkey and Korea is the association significant and positive. For some periods and in some of the countries, there appears to be a negative relationship between saving and the index. For instance, saving plummets in Chile (figure 1a and 1d) with the onset of reformperhaps reflecting the easing of credit constraints-then recovers gradually until a more significant increase starts in 1985, associated in part with the introduction of a fully funded pension system. In Mexico (figures 6a and 6d), we observe a protracted decline in the saving ratio since reforms began. 15 A lack of correlation between the index of financial reform and saving is evident in the cases of Ghana (figures 2a and 2d) and Zimbabwe (figures 8a and 8d), where saving first rose then fell, while the index was registering continuing gains. 16 In Malaysia, saving did rise in the 1970s as reforms began, but then subsequently leveled off and fell back to its original level. In contrast, there is a clearer positive association between the index and saving in Korea (figures 4a and 4d), particularly until the late 1980s, Turkey (figures 7a and 7d), and, to a lesser extent, Indonesia, where, however, part of the increase in saving occurred before domestic financial reforms began (figures 3a and 3d).
It is noteworthy that the figures (and bivariate correlations) suggest a closer association between the behavior of the index and measures of financial depth for a majority of the countries. The exceptions are Turkey, Ghana, and Zimbabwe. There also appears to be a generally positive 11 As an alternative, we also experiment below with a weighted average of the more important principal components, using as weights the fraction of the total standard deviation explained by each component. The results are very similar and are not reported for reasons of space.
12 See also Demetriades and Luintel (1997) for an application to India of the principal-components approach to aggregating the information contained in a combination of policy changes and outcome variables. 13 The Chilean reforms had begun in 1974 with the freeing of interest rates and the beginning of the easing of reserve requirements, and continued in the mid-and late-1970s with bank privatization and the raising of ceilings on foreign borrowing. After the reversals of 1982, liberalization resumed in 1986.
14 Caprio, Atiyas, and Hanson (1994) describe financial reforms in Chile, Malaysia, Indonesia, Korea, Turkey, and New Zealand. See also Klingebiel (1996, 1996a) for a further discussion of the Malaysian experience. 15 The sharp drop in the adjusted series in 1988 is due to a large increase in the measured stock of debt to which the adjustment applies in that year. 16 Albeit with continued negative interest rates. The persistence of negative real interest rates, notably in the cases of Ghana and Zimbabwe, after the onset of reform measures calls into question how real reforms have been. Even though interest rates were deregulated, in some countries they continue to be controlled by a cartel of banks, often at the informal behest of the authorities. association between our index and real interest rates (which is statistically significant in half of the countries).
D. How Do the Main Components of Liberalization
Affect Saving?
While our main focus has so far been on overall summary indicators of reform, reflecting the view that the overall reform process-though it takes some time and may be reversed-ultimately comes as a package, it is worth pausing to consider how each of the eight main components of our index is likely to affect saving. There is no unambiguous theoretical prediction because each change has several channels of effect; thus, the listing is chiefly of heuristic value:
1. Interest liberalization: On its own, this will tend to increase interest rates, perhaps encouraging saving (if the substitution effect dominates the income effect), but more predictably reducing disintermediation.
Reduction in reserve requirements:
This increases the resources available for lending by the formal financial sector, and also reduces the break-even intermediation spread, thereby likely increasing deposit rates for a given level of lending rates. The net effect will also be influenced by the response of other government policy instruments: For example, the monetary policy impact of the reduction in reserve requirements may be neutralized through an open market sale.
Reduction in directed credit:
The response of the banks may well be to increase lending to households (never favored in directed-credit regimes), thereby tending to lower net household saving. Inasmuch as the rest of credit is reallocated within the business FIGURE 1.-CHILE sector, there is no obvious basis for predicting the impact on overall business-sector saving. 4. Privatization: This too may be associated with an increase in lending to households, a line of business from which state-owned banks have often been discouraged. 5. Procompetition measures: A more competitive environment may lead to a move to increased risk taking in lending, as the return on low-risk lending narrows. Households offer an inexhaustible supply of high-risk lending opportunities, so this could be associated with lower net household saving. 6. Increased prudential regulation: This will tend to offset risk taking discussed under 5, above, hence perhaps increasing net household saving; furthermore, a new perception that the banks are sound may encourage a growth in intermediation. However, regulation may also serve to reduce upward pressure on deposit interest rates. 7. Securities market development: By providing a wider range of savings instruments, this could channel funds into the formal financial sector. The overall effect on saving is, however, ambiguous. 8. International financial liberalization: Even if foreign funds flow in following liberalization, the net effect is likely to include an increase in rates of return, as barriers to capital outflow are removed. The net effect on saving could be positive as in 1 above, but this is less clear, as banks can now use funds borrowed from abroad to support lending to households or firms.
The contradictory likely effects from different components of liberalization will be clear from this brief review. Grouping the components into two subaggregates may help. For example, one natural dividing line is between macroeconomic liberalization components 1, 2, and 8, and the microeconomic measures 3 through 7. Even here, there is no clear prediction, although some presumption from the above discussion that the macro components would be somewhat more likely to increase saving than the micro. An alternative way of grouping the components into two subaggregates is to separate out the measures that are most concerned with FIGURE 2.-GHANA reducing the role of the state in the allocation of credit 2, 3, and 4 from the rest that act mainly through their effect on the characteristics of asset returns. To the extent that the reduced state involvement helps to reduce liquidity constraints for households, there is a presumption that 2, 3, and 4 could reduce net household saving, with perhaps the opposite likely on balance for the rest. Based on these two alternative aggregations of the various aspects of financial reform, we have extracted the first principal component for each grouping of the components of liberalization. Each pair will be used in our econometric work as an alternative to the aggregate index. We use the abbreviations i-mac and i-mic, and i-liq and i-rsk, 17 for the two pairs of subindices thus computed.
IV. Econometric Evidence: Saving Functions
A. Benchmark Model: Country-by-Country Estimates
We begin by estimating the long-run relationship between saving and its determinants separately for each country over the period 1970-1994. 18 In the benchmark specification, the (unadjusted) private saving rate s t /y t is modeled as a function of the natural log of real per capita GNDI ln y t , the real interest rate r t , our overall index of financial liberalization index t , the inflation rate t , and the government saving rate, govs t . 19 The choice of variables included in the equation is limited partly by series availability and partly by the length of the sample period. In particular we would like to have included a satisfactory proxy for nonhuman wealth, but available ones, such as the stock of high-powered money or government debt, are more likely to be misleading than helpful.
Inclusion of income in the specification might raise questions, given that it would not be expected to influence the saving ratio at the individual level in a standard formulation of the lifecycle model. However, any of several considerations can suggest income as an explanatory variable, including minimum subsistence consumption, nonhomotheticity of the utility function, precautionary considerations, and liquidity constraints. 20 In case of any residual doubt about the direction of causality between income and the saving rate, we also present a specification in which income is excluded from the set of regressors.
We have tested the order of integration of the variables both country by country, using the ADF test, and by panel, using the Im, Pesaran, and Shin (1996) test. The results of the tests suggest that we cannot reject the hypothesis that s t /y t , ln y t , ln y t , index t , and govs t are integrated of order one. (See table 1 , part I, for the panel tests; the country-bycountry ADF tests are not reported for reasons of space.) However, for some countries, there is evidence against the unit root hypothesis for r t and t . For instance, when a trend is included, the hypothesis that r t has a unit root is rejected at the 5%-significance level in Malaysia, Korea, and Indonesia. Also, a unit root in t is rejected for Malaysia, Indonesia, and Turkey. The panel test suggests the rejection of the unit root hypothesis for both variables.
Using the Dickey-Fuller (DF) or the adjusted DickeyFuller (ADF) tests on the residuals of the cointegrating regressions, country by country, and the critical values interest rate and of the inflation rate. See appendix B for further details on variable constructions and on the data sources. 20 On the last two issues, see Deaton (1992, ch. 6) . To the extent that borrowing constraints vary with financial liberalization, the coefficient on income might also vary over time. We explore this issue empirically in section V, in the context of Euler equations for consumption. MacKinnon (1990) to adjust for sample size, we cannot reject the hypothesis of no cointegration between the vector of variables mentioned above (whether or not income, the real interest rate, and inflation are included). These cointegration tests must be treated with a healthy dose of caution both because of the low power of such tests against reasonable alternatives and because of the small number of observations available relative to the number of variables. As shown in table 1, part II, moreover, the panel cointegration test proposed by Pedroni (1997a Pedroni ( , 1997b , and the Im, Pesaran, and Shin test applied to the residuals of the cointegrating vector are consistent with the existence of a cointegrating relationship between s t /y t , index t , govs t -or between these three and ln y t if it is included (or between s t /y t , index t , govs t , ln y t , r t , and t , if the troublesome unit root tests on the last two variables are disregarded). The same propositions hold if we replace index with either of the pairs of split indices.
In table 2, we present two estimates of the cointegrating vector, when ln y t , r t , and t are included. The estimates of part I are OLS. Because the conventional OLS standard errors are not valid in this context, part II shows approximate dynamic GLS estimates obtained by including the contemporaneous differences of the right-side variables as additional regressors and allowing for an AR(1) error term. 21 The main drawback of the dynamic GLS estimates is the small number of degrees of freedom available, so that it is probably wise to consider both sets of results. Although estimates of the coefficients of r t and t would be problematic if those variables were truly stationary, their inclusion does not invalidate the consistency for the coefficients (and associated inference) for the other nonstationary variables.
Despite the fact that we have here corrected the omission of other dimensions of financial liberalization, there is (except for the OLS estimate for Mexico) no evidence from the country-by-country estimates of a significant distinct positive effect of the real interest rate on saving. In most cases, the long-run point relationship is negative (and significantly so in the case of Ghana and Indonesia). The evidence based on the time series for individual developing 21 Ideally, one would have wanted to include additional leads and lags of the differences; however, the length of our sample precludes us from doing that. Our procedure can be seen as an approximation to the DGLS procedure in Stock and Watson (1993) . countries confirms, therefore, the general conclusion derived from previous studies using pooled time-series crosscountry data that it is not possible to pin down a systematic positive effect on saving of increases in the interest rate.
So far as the effect of financial liberalization itself is concerned, the picture is mixed. For Korea and Mexico, the coefficient of the index of financial liberalization is negative and significant in the long run (using the dynamic GLS estimates). On the other hand, for Turkey and Ghana, there is evidence of a positive and significant long-run effect. 22 The point estimates imply sizable impacts of the index on private saving. For example, the results of table 2, part II, imply that liberalization in Korea and Mexico has permanently lowered saving by 12% and 6% of GNDI, respectively (using the realized change in the index). On the other hand, we estimate that liberalization has raised the saving rate in Turkey by 13% and in Ghana by 6%.
So far as the other variables are concerned, the income variable is significant in most cases (both in the long and short run). The sign of the coefficient of the inflation rate differs across countries: significantly negative in Ghana, Indonesia, and Malaysia; significantly positive in Mexico. 23 Finally, there is evidence that an increase in government saving leads to a decrease in private saving. Actually, for Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico (and, depending upon the specification, Chile and Zimbabwe), the estimates are consistent with Ricardian equivalence, in that the coefficient of govs t is not significantly different from Ϫ1. 24 22 Note that these are also the two countries where index t is uncorrelated with private credit, suggesting that borrowing constraints may not have been much eased. 23 A variety of effects may be associated with inflation, including the fact that it is positively correlated with the private-sector's capital loss on monetary assets, the relative-price confusion effect of Deaton (1977) , substitution of consumer durables for financial assets as an inflation hedge, or various forms of uncertainty.
24 See also Burnside (1996) on Mexico. 
B. Disaggregating the Effect of Different Elements of Liberalization
In the lower panels of table 2, we also report the results obtained when the overall index of liberalization is replaced by the pairs of subindices (i-mac and i-mic, i-rsk and i-liq) previously discussed. 25 We report only the coefficients of the subindices because the rest of the estimates are little altered when we substitute the subindices for the overall index. The most striking feature is that the estimated effect of i-liq is negative for every country, and significantly so for three countries (Chile, Malaysia, and Mexico). The estimated effect of i-rsk is positive but not significant. A quite similar pattern is observed for the alternative pair of subindices: Here, it is i-mic that tends to be negative, and is always negative when significant (for Korea, Malaysia, and Mexico). This suggests that i-liq and i-mic include the liberalization components most associated with reduced saving, probably through relaxation of borrowing constraints.
C. Robustness
The general conclusions we have reached concerning the effects of financial liberalization in individual countries are broadly robust to several changes in the specification, some of which are reported in table 3. For instance, table 3, part I, shows the dynamic GLS results when we exclude ln y t from the cointegrating vector; part II of the same table excludes r t , and t , while part III uses adjusted private and public saving rates and income to allow for capital gains and losses induced by inflation on assets denominated in local currency. Excluding the interest rate and inflation and adjusting for capital gains and losses leaves the results virtually unchanged. When we exclude the income variable, the overall index is more often positive and significant, probably because it captures income's upward trend. The negative impacts of i-mic and i-liq are less unambiguous in this specification. Similarly, when we exclude the interest rate, i-rsk becomes more significant as it proxies for interest-rate changes.
The general conclusions derived from the benchmark model are also robust to other changes in the specification, which have not been reported for reasons of space. For instance, we have used a weighted average of the first few principal components (with the ratio of the standard deviation relative to the total standard deviation as weights) to calculate the aggregate index of financial liberalization. This is equivalent to including the principal components separately and imposing the restriction that their coefficient is proportional to the fraction of the total variance explained by each one of them. We also reestimated the model by using a ''backward'' real interest rate, defined as the nominal interest rate minus the inflation rate over the preceding period. In each case, our conclusions do not change. We tried adding the dependency ratio to the cointegrating vector; we included an interaction term between the interest rate and the financial liberalization index to allow for the interest-rate effect to differ depending upon the degree of liberalization; we used both linear and quadratic interest-rate terms to capture the idea that the effect on saving may depend upon the value of the interest rate itself. These additional variables did not have significant coefficients.
Finally, in order to assess also the short-run effects of liberalization, we estimated an error-correction model for saving (not reported here for the sake of brevity). Only for one country is there a significant coefficient on the first difference of the liberalization index (Korea, where the impact effect is negative). The coefficient on the change in the interest rate is positive and significant only for Mexico. Thus, there is, for the short-run also, no general evidence of an increase in saving induced by financial liberalization. 
D. Panel Results
It is worth investigating whether we can sharpen our conclusions by assuming that coefficients are equal across countries, thereby making fuller use of the panel nature of the data. If the coefficients are truly the same across countries, then there should be a gain in efficiency by imposing such restrictions. The drawback may be that one may be imposing invalid restrictions, because of differences in preferences, institutional settings, and nature of the liberalization. Moreover, the construction of the index does not guarantee comparability of scale across countries. Table 4 shows the results of this approach. Part I contains the benchmark model (using the aggregate index and its subcomponents), while, in part II, the income variable is excluded. In each part, the first three columns include only the levels of the explanatory variables and present estimates of the cointegrating vector using SURE. The last three columns include first difference of the regressors, and an AR(1) error term is allowed for (as in the approximate dynamic GLS specification). The estimated coefficients on the change terms (as well as the first-order autocorrelation coefficient) are allowed to differ across countries, and the model is estimated by nonlinear methods. In all cases, we report the full set of results (including the coefficients on all the level regressors) for both the specifications with the aggregate index and for those with its subcomponents.
In this constrained estimates, the coefficient on government saving is negative, but significantly different from 1, implying a rejection of Ricardian equivalence. The coefficient of the inflation rate is positive and mostly significant. More importantly, from our point of view, the panel estimates imply that the real interest rate has a significant positive effect and that the aggregate index of financial liberalization has a negative effect on saving, which is significant at the 5% level in the benchmark specification (constrained dynamic GLS specification), although only at the 10% level in the specification without income. The negative and significant effect of the i-liq subindices is confirmed by the panel estimates, the latter strongly suggesting that relaxation of liquidity constraints is a key factor underlying the fall in saving. I-mic also remains negative in all specifications but one. 26 However, the panel estimates are not unproblematic: A likelihood-ratio test does imply that the assumed equality of coefficients can be rejected at conventional significance levels, casting doubt on the imposition of equality across countries.
Taking the panel results at face value, we would conclude that financial liberalization is likely to lower saving rates. For instance, in a benchmark model with the aggregate index, a typical combination of interest-rate change and other liberalizations is estimated to lower saving by 1.2% of GNDI, using the estimates in the first column, and by 5.5% using the estimates in the fourth column. When the i-rsk/i-liq pair is used, the decrease equals 1.75% of GNDI, using the estimates in the third column. 27
V. Econometric Evidence: Augmented Euler Equations
The negative impact of financial liberalization on saving found for some countries above suggests that liberalization may have weakened credit or liquidity constraints. Curiously, despite dramatic changes in financial structure worldwide, the Euler equation literature on liquidity-constrained consumption has not focused on time-varying constraints.
Here, we start with the Campbell-Mankiw (1989 , 1991 ) approach of estimating an Euler equation augmented by the presence of liquidity-constrained consumers, and attempt to estimate variation in the proportion of constrained consumers as liberalization proceeds. Thus, let be the proportion of unconstrained consumers and assume that the remainder consume all their income. If is constant, then two standard Euler equations are 28 For constant interest and quadratic utility:
For time-varying interest and CRRA utility:
where µ ϭ Ϫ ln (1 ϩ ␦), ␦ is the subjective discount rate, is the intertemporal elasticity of substitution, and 26 The constrained dynamic GLS specification failed to converge for the i-mic/i-mac pair. Note that Loayza, Schmidt-Hebbel, and Servén (2000) find a negative effect of credit flows on savings using panel data. 27 We assumed an interest rate increase from Ϫ10% per annum to ϩ5% (typical of the sample, apart from the inflationary episodes in Chile and Ghana). We set the change in index to 7, in i-rsk to 6, and in i-liq to 4, equal to their respective mean change between the initial and final year of the sample. 28 Cf. Attanasio and Browning (1995) . Pedroni (1997a Pedroni ( , 1997b 2) In addition to the estimated coefficients (t-statistics in parentheses) and R 2 of the basic regression, the table shows the estimated coefficients of the split indices in the two alternative versions where these replace the basic liberalization index. 3) %var denotes the proportion of total liberalization matrix variance accounted for first principal component (Index). 4) The dynamic GLS estimates are obtained by including the contemporaneous changes of all the RHS variables as additional regressors and allowing for AR (1) y c is the per capita income of the constrained consumers, assumed to be a constant 29 fraction of per capita income in the economy.
If we allow to change through time, then equation (1) and (2) 
where t ϭ t ⑀ t . Equation (3) and (4) emphasize that the sensitivity of consumption to income varies over time, as the share of liquidity-constrained consumers varies. Indeed, the sensitivity of aggregate consumption to current income is due to the fact that some consumers consume their income, and as such is proportional to the relative size of the credit-constrained group. The sensitivity of consumption to the interest rate also changes over time in equation (4). But the main novelty is that the time variation of introduces additional regressors in equation (3) and (4). In particular, there is a new term of error-correction type involving lagged consumption and income, whose coefficient is equal to the rate of change in 29 Assuming constant is necessary to have equation (3) and (4) below in a tractable form. 30 To derive equation (3), define per capita consumption c t ϭ
, where the superscripts u and c denote unconstrained and constrained consumers, respectively. Then, take first differences to obtain
Substituting the definition of c tϪ1 and using c t c ϭ y t gives equation (3). The derivation of equation (4) proceeds along similar lines, using a geometric mean with population weights for average per capita consumption (whereas, in the empirical implementation, we substitute a simple mean consumption). the proportion of unconstrained consumers. This consequence of time-varying liquidity constraints seems to have been overlooked in the literature. The error term in equation (3) and (4) also depends on t giving rise to a need to seek consistent estimates by IV or GMM techniques. For instance, assume that the set of instruments used, z tϪ1 , belongs to the information set available at time t Ϫ 1. If t is also a function of variables known at time t Ϫ 1, then E(z tϪ1 t ) ϭ 0, because the forecast error ⑀ t is by definition uncorrelated with variables at t Ϫ 1. More precisely,
The last assumption is plausible if financial liberalization measures are actually effective one period after being implemented, so that t depends upon the lagged value of the liberalization index.
The final step is to relate t to financial liberalization. We will assume that t is an increasing function of the index (or subindices) of financial liberalization lagged one period, index tϪ1 . In table 5, we summarize the empirical results for the specification that includes the interest rate, estimated by GMM (past values of the included variables are used as instruments). In the first part of the table, we present the estimates of the model under the assumption of a constant t . (See equation (2).) For the majority of countries, the coefficient of income is significant at conventional levels. The coefficient is positive and significant when it is restricted to be equal across countries. (See the first column.) All this evidence is consistent with the presence of liquidity constraints. In the second part of the table, we have adopted a logistic specification for t , so that t ϭ 1/(1 ϩ exp (Ϫ␣ 0 Ϫ ␣ 1 index tϪ1 )), and we have estimated model (4). Iffinancial liberalization relaxes financial constraints, ␣ 1 would be positive. For two countries (Ghana and Zimbabwe), we have not succeeded in obtaining convergence. For the remaining six countries, the results, on the whole, show lack of a significant relationship between t and the index. 31 In the only case in which ␣ 1 is significant at conventional levels (Turkey), it is indeed positive. However, Turkey was the country in which the saving-function results suggested a positive direct effect of liberalization on saving.
Bearing in mind the indications from the saving function (section IV)-that liquidity constraints might be more associated with subindiced i-mic and i-liq-we experimented with substituting these for the overall index in the Euler equation. However, the results do not improve, and not much is learned from this additional exercise. (The results are not reported for brevity's sake.)
The Euler equation results suggest that financial liberalization has had little impact on the amount of credit available to consumers through the formal financial sector. Alternatively, the inconclusive results may stem from the econometric problem of pinning down what is essentially the coefficient of the product of a nonstationary variable (index, or its subcomponents), with a stationary one (⌬ ln y t ). More generally, one might question the adequacy of the instruments used in estimating the augmented Euler equations.
A further reason for us to expect to find (as we do) a stronger influence of liberalization in our saving equation by comparison with the Euler equation is that the dependent variable of the former relates to total private saving (business as well as household sectors), while the latter relates in principle only to household-sector behavior. Just as it is more sensitive to exogenous shocks (Honohan and Atiyas, 31 The basic sense of the results does not change if we allow ␣ 0 to be different when the growth rate of income is negative, or if we choose a different functional form (such as the Gumbel) for . Finally, note that we have failed to achieve convergence when we impose equality of coefficients across countries. 1993), business saving in developing countries may be more influenced by liberalization than household behavior, especially as the latter may be more conditioned by informal finance than by reforms that affect mainly the formal sector.
VI. Conclusions
Attention has long focused on the interest-elasticity of saving as a key parameter in gauging the impact of financial liberalization. Our econometric results confirm the visual impression from the figures, as well as much previous literature, that there is no strong, reliable, interest-rate effect on saving. Only when the data is pooled and one assumes that the long-run coefficients are equal across countries (a restriction that the data rejects) can we find evidence of a significant, positive, interest-rate effect on saving, and even then the effect is small.
Our aggregate index of financial liberalization captures several aspects of reform that are not fully represented by changes in the interest rate, such as the increased availability of a variety of saving media with better risk-return characteristics or the relaxation of borrowing constraints.
But here too, the econometric evidence on the impact of reform on saving is mixed. When saving functions are estimated for each of the countries separately, the overall long-run effect is found to be significantly negative for two (Korea and Mexico), positive for two (Ghana and Turkey), with no clear effect discernible in the others. When the long-run responses are constrained to be equal, the effect of the financial liberalization index is significantly negative and large enough to offset (in these constrained estimates) the estimated positive effect of the interest-rate increases that have accompanied the reforms.
Delving behind the aggregate index to explore the differential impact of different elements of the overall process of financial liberalization, we found contrasts between the estimated impact of micro and macro reforms, and between the liberalization of access to credit and remaining reforms. Interestingly, a negative impact on saving is more reliably associated with micro than with macro, and with reforms liberalizing the allocation of credit (thereby reducing liquidity constraints). These negative effects are statistically significant for three countries (Malaysia, Mexico, and either Chile or Korea), and in the panel. The panel results based on the decomposed subindices confirm a negative and significant association between financial liberalization and saving that dominates the positive interest-rate effect. These results suggest that the dominant factor is the negative impact on saving of a relaxation, varying from country to country, of borrowing constraints for households and firms.
These estimates, although obtained from dynamic models, refer to long-run effects. Pinning down the short-run effects seems elusive. The impact effect of liberalization is often associated with a transitory boom in credit and a surge in property prices, but whether this occurs depends strongly on the conduct of monetary policy and macro-management generally. Sorting out the short-run influence of macro policy from financial liberalization would require data on a larger set of countries.
Our estimates of an augmented Euler equation for consumption confirm previous evidence of excess sensitivity of consumption to income. However, with the exception of Turkey, there is not much evidence that such sensitivity has decreased with financial liberalization, although this may be due to the econometric difficulty of obtaining precise estimates of the parameters.
For the present, our results suggest that, while financial liberalization may sometimes increase private saving, the opposite is more likely to be the case. Considering that government saving can also be adversely affected, 32 it is at best unwise to rely on an increase in saving as the channel through which financial liberalization can be expected to increase growth.
Even if financial liberalization does not increase private saving, it does not follow that the process contracts the volume of funds applied to productive investment. For one thing, liberalization can increase the inflow of capital, including the return of flight capital (Bartolini and Drazen (1997) ). For another, by strengthening market discipline and increasing the autonomy of banks and other financial institutions, the various elements of the reform process can have the effect of eliminating less-productive uses of loanable funds. These two potentially important aspects are not considered in the present paper.
APPENDIX A
Building an Index for Financial Liberalization
Financial liberalization packages generally consist of a wide range of different measures. We identify eight main dimensions, six of them grouped under the heading ''domestic financial liberalization,'' one on securities markets, and the last on international financial liberalization. Dummy variables are constructed to represent liberalization: Each takes the value 1 when the system was liberalized in the relevant dimension.
The result is a matrix X of dummies for each country. Each column represents a single dummy (the rows represent years). Although there are eight main dimensions of policy change, the number of columns differs from country to country because the complexity of the policy changes differed, often requiring more than one dummy for a given dimension. Our approach to summarizing liberalization is to reduce the dimensionality of this matrix using principal components.
In addition to using the first principal component of the matrix X, we also computed a weighted average of the more relevant components that explain, cumulatively, 95% of the total variation of X. The weights used are the fraction of the total standard deviation explained by each component, so that the first principal component is more heavily weighted than the second, and so on.
Finally, as described in the text, we also computed two pairs of subindices by constructing two submatrices from X (and extracting the first principal components) as follows: The columns of X representing the timing of the most important liberalization measures and are ordered according to the following scheme:
Domestic Financial Liberalization
1.a Interest rates
Dummies for the timing of liberalization of interest rates (Dri ϭ 1 when interest rates are freed.)
1.b Procompetition measures
Includes lowering of entry barriers, permissions to offer new services, and other measures intended to foster competition in the financial markets. (Dco ϭ 1 when measures are taken.)
1.c Reserve requirements
Most financial liberalization packages include a reduction in reserve requirements, which increases the funds available for lending. (Dres ϭ 1 when reserve requirements are reduced.)
1.d Directed credit
This set of variables includes all the measures aimed to reduce the amount of preferential loans (or loans at a preferential rate) that banks are forced to make. (Dpr ϭ 1 when directed credit is reduced.)
1.e Banks' ownership
Dpriv ϭ 1 when banks are privatized or government controls are reduced.
1.f Prudential regulation
Typically, financial liberalization programs include a strengthening of prudential regulation and supervisory powers of the CB. This is relevant in which it can increase the trust in the financial system and hence attract more deposits. (Dreg ϭ 1 when prudential regulation measures are in force.)
Securities Markets
These variables capture the measures aimed at deregulating and developing the securities and stock markets. (Dst ϭ 1 when markets are deregulated.)
International Financial Liberalization
Domestic financial liberalization is generally paired with international liberalization both in the capital and in the current account. Here we use the information relative to the capital account and the exchange rate. (Df ϭ 1 when capital movements and/or the exchange rate are liberalized.)
We list below for each country the policy events that are used to construct the dummies, and the dates on which the changes occured.
The first dummy is ϭ 1 after 1988; the second is ϭ 1 after 1990; the third is ϭ 1 after 1991.
Securities Markets
1977 The stock exchange opens in its present form but remains virtually inactive until 1989. 1988 New measures to strengthen and deregulate the stock market.
The dummy ϭ 1 after 1988.
International Financial Liberalization
No controls on capital movements and foreign exchange.
KOREA
Domestic Financial Liberalization
1.a Interest rates
1984 Financial intermediaries (nonbank) are given discretionary power in determining lending rates. 1988 Most banks' lending and long-term deposits rates are deregulated.
The first dummy is ϭ 1 after 1983; the second is ϭ 1 after 1987.
1.b Procompetition measures
1983 Entry barriers are lowered, and banks are allowed to introduce new services. 1989 Entry barriers are lowered again. The establishment of new financial institutions is approved.
The first dummy is ϭ 1 after 1982; the second is ϭ 1 after 1988.
1.d Directed credit
The share of policy loans is quite high, after peaking at the end of the 1970s. No significant measures taken within sample period to reduce it.
1.e Banks' ownership
Although privatized in 1981-1983, banks remained heavily controlled by the State.
1.f Prudential regulation
1991 General Banking Act introduces new prudential measures and imposes supervisory regulations.
The dummy ϭ 1 after 1990.
Securities Markets
1992 The stock market opens for direct purchase by foreigners.
The dummy ϭ 1 after 1991.
International Financial Liberalization
Capital movements and the exchange rate are still heavily regulated. Significant dates are 1981 Capital movements are less controlled. 1989 Foreign exchange market is established.
The first dummy is ϭ 1 after 1980; the second is ϭ 1 after 1988. We ignore event (a) because it is at the beginning of the sample. Seven dummies summarize interest rates liberalization. Dummies 1 to 4 are for the deposit rates, dummies 5 to 7 for the lending rates. The first is ϭ 1 after 1971 (b), the second is ϭ 1 after 1972 (c,d), the third is ϭ 1 after 1977 (e), the fourth is ϭ 1 between 1978 and 1985 and then after 1986 (events (g) and (h)), the fifth is ϭ 1 between 1978 and 1983 (events (e) and (f ), the sixth is ϭ 1 between 1978 and 1983 and then after 1990 (events (e), (f ), and ( j)), the seventh is ϭ 1 between 1978 and 1987 and then after 1990 (events (e), (f ), (i), and ( j )).
1.d Directed credit
1975 Priority lending is introduced. CB controls both the quantity and the interest charged on primary borrowers. 1979 CB issues annual priority lending guidelines, still leaving considerable discretion to the banks and without seriously distorting the interest rates. 1991 The number of priority sectors and the required loan amount is reduced.
The first dummy is ϭ 1 before 1975; the second is ϭ 1 before 1975 and after 1978; the third is ϭ 1 before 1975 and after 1990.
1.f Prudential regulation
1988 The Banking and Financial Institutions Act extends and strengthens CB's supervisory powers.
Dummy ϭ 1 after 1988.
International Financial Liberalization
1973 Exchange rate regulations are relaxed. 1987 New measures to provide investors with greater access to credit.
The first dummy ϭ 1 after 1972; the second ϭ 1 after 1986. 1993 Stock exchange is opened to foreign investors.
The first dummy ϭ 1 after 1972; the second ϭ 1 after 1992. 
International Liberalization
